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i. Abstract  
The changing legal landscape of the market for ancient art provides an opportunity to study the 
impact of legal constraints on economic markets. Working with novel data from Sotheby’s and 
Bonhams auction houses and court decisions from London and New York between 2003 and 
2019, I look for the effects of legal rulings and settlements on the art market. My empirical 
analysis models provenance information quality—the public history of ownership of an object—
and prices. I focus on the in-country effects of court decisions on prices and provenance using 
OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Overall, I find that accumulating court decisions 
have a positive effect on provenance information quality and that court decisions impact prices 
both directly and via its earlier effects on provenance information.  
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Legal institutions constrain economic markets. Perhaps the most obvious are laws that 
have already been signed into effect. Recent scholarship, however, suggests that laws must be 
enforceable via the judicial system and citable in court decisions in order to actually change 
behavior. Court activity informs future laws and decisions through the power of precedent. It is 
still unclear to economists, however, how general court activity affects market activity. Court 
rulings, punitive and high-profile settlements, and especially publicized legal cases are a few 
types of judicial activity of interest in this research. This paper is particularly concerned with 
how court decisions and settlements directly or indirectly affect the behaviors of actors in the 
international market for art.  
The art market is appropriate for this study because of its changing legal landscape. 
Domestic and international markets have seen increased efforts to combat the illicit trade of 
antiquities and the circulation of illicitly traded or looted art through auction houses. An 
antiquity is defined as an object, especially something archaeologically, historically or 
artistically valuable or interesting, that dates from a previous era (“IFAR Users’ Guide,” 2019). 
Antiquities sold at auction are typically accompanied by a detailed set of information that 
includes material type, condition reports, estimated and sold prices, and provenance— the public 
history of ownership of a piece of art. This paper asks if and how various types of domestic court 
decisions made in the United States or United Kingdom affect the quality of provenance 
information and the prices of antiquities in New York and London.  
This paper’s data sample is comprised of antiquities brought to auction between 2003 and 
2019. This sample is organized into tiers of influence and market control by auction house as 
defined by art economist Clare McAndrews, in the 2019 Art Market Report. Antiquities data 
from first-tier Sotheby’s auction house are derived from auctions taking place in London and 
New York. The second-tier source is Bonhams auction house, which curated auctions in London 
during the sample period. I also identify and classify court decisions and high-profile settlements 
in New York and London between 2003 and 2019. The novel auction and judicial data are 
combined in order to test the effects of accumulating court decisions and specific time periods of 
active court decisions. Based on previous research, which suggests that not all types of judicial 
activity have the same upshots, I focus my empirical effort on capturing the direct effect of three 
distinct time periods in which court decisions were active in New York and of two time periods 
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in which decisions were active in London. The goal of the empirical approach is to determine if 
and how court decisions affect prices directly or via provenance quality, and whether Greek, 
Roman, and Egyptian antiquities have special trends or are affected by court decisions differently 
than other types of art. Greek, Roman, and Egyptian objects are the most commonly offered 
types of ancient art at auction. 
My empirical approach deals with several challenges. Changing monetary statistics or art 
market trends, such as generational changes in art type preference, might reflect commercial and 
buyers’ changes unrelated to market controls including industry regulations, legislation, or 
international directives (Brodie, 2019). Auction catalogues and online results are useful sources 
of material, provenance, and price information, but can be misleading unless placed in the 
context of the broader market for art and macro trends. For these reasons, the model also 
captures larger benchmark shifts in international market activity. Other obstacles to the project 
include the pertinence of in-person auctions given the rising trend in online trade of antiquities 
via sites such as eBay and Facebook (Brodie, 2015b). Finally, it is possible that when prices rise 
and provenance information standards increase, illicitly traded goods slip into the black market 
and out of sight of the auction world and scholars looking to measure illicit trade.  
The contributions to the study of the intersection of law and economics include 
investigation into the timeline of effects following court decisions. My analyses delve into the 
international connections and cross-effects of court decisions. I ask whether court decisions and 
settlements from one specific area, New York City or London, impact their intended geographic 
areas more assuredly than areas at a further distance from the decision location. Unlike previous 
literature, this paper studies cases which do not rely on cultural heritage law alone to achieve 
rulings, but general legal issues such as theft, importation and exportation, and ownership rights. 
The auction data are novel and comprehensive, having received permission to scrape information 
from Sotheby’s and Bonhams’ websites. Finally, my findings exemplify the diverse and 
complicated nature of the art and cultural heritage law world and will help to plot a path forward 
for protecting against illicit trafficking and circulation. 
Having introduced the legal, institutional, and economic motivations at hand, Section 2 of 
lays out related literature on the intersection of law and economics and art economics. Section 3 
provides an overview of American, British, and international efforts to curb the circulation and 
illicit trade of antiquities, legal background to the court decision timeline, and a brief 
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introduction to the art auction dynamics. Section 4 plots a theoretical model which suggests a 
relationship between provenance information quality and prices. Section 5 explores auction and 
court data, motivating the empirical model of Section 6. Section 7 explores the regression results 
and the direct and indirect effects of court decisions on the sold price and provenance 
information quality of art. Section 8 concludes and offers a connection between legal institutions 
and market activity.  
 
2. Related Literature  
2.1. The Law, Courts, and Economics 
The impact of court decisions on economic markets is a relatively new subject of 
investigation. Only one economics paper focuses on the effects of court decisions on art auctions. 
The majority of existing literature connects regulatory efforts in financial markets to 
governmental and institutional measurements, such as corruption levels. Other studies choose not 
to focus on illicitly traded art and antiquities, but human and drug trafficking. This paper looks to 
draw new conclusions about the effects of US and UK court activity on antiquity sales.  
The response of different types of cross-border trade to legislation has been noticed in 
empirical studies. Two studies investigate legislation targeting human trafficking and drug 
trafficking, in particular. Akee, Basu, Bedi, and Chau (2014) documented mutual reinforcement 
by domestic and international restrictions on illicit employment within the human trafficking 
market. Domestic crackdowns are strengthened by international efforts, and vice versa, to curb 
buyer-demand-driven demand for illicit employment, which is the main driver of human 
trafficking (Akee, Basu, Bedi, & Chau, 2014). Becker, Murphy, and Grossman found that when 
demand and supply for drugs are not very elastic, it does not pay to enforce prohibitions unless 
the social value is negative (2006). Negative social values are adverse effects of activities on the 
overall wellbeing, work, and lives of individuals or groups in society. If auction houses are in 
fact choosing to ignore laws or precedent when choosing how much provenance information to 
provide, it could be because of a lack of “negative social value” amongst principals or buyers 
and sellers. In this case, a lack of public reaction advances a lack of private action. The 
consideration of litigatory effects—those created by court action—on foreign market activity, is 
the main gap in this literature. My research supplies a new exploration of the effects of domestic 
case law and court activities on international market dynamics. 
 6 
The impact of policy reforms is a popular topic in law and economics literature. Jha 
(2019) connected reforms concerning financial liberalization to corruption (Jha, 2019). Jha finds 
that regardless of a country’s legal origin, new reforms targeted at financial liberalization reduce 
corruption. Both common law countries, like the US and UK, and civil law countries, like 
France, can use financial reform laws with equivalent market effects. Jha provides a framework 
to study how legislation, not court rulings, impact adverse behaviors. This thesis will expand 
upon the question by asking whether court decisions involving various legal matters such as 
theft, replevin, illegal possession, and illegal exportation or importation encourage the curation 
of better-quality provenance information or higher prices.  
The effects of court rulings on markets has been less investigated than the effects of the 
introduction of legislative regulations on the markets. Beltrametti and Marrone (2016) are the 
first authors to specifically explore the effects of court rulings on art markets in the United 
States. They question whether the outcome of certain court decisions can reduce the illicit trade 
of antiquities. With hand-collected data and a difference-in-differences probit model, the authors 
find that the likelihood a good being sold legally rises in response to harshly punitive court 
rulings, and that prices and better provenance information will improve in response to rulings 
with highly punitive outcomes. The authors judge a case’s punitive power based on the case’s 
number of citations in future case rulings and its usefulness in clarifying existing legislation. My 
auction dataset partially overlaps Beltrametti and Marrone’s and adds observations between 2015 
and 2019. I also include a non-antiquity class of lots which are sold in the same auctions as 
Greek, Roman, and Egyptian antiquities. This thesis will expand upon their question by 
including different types of court activity in the model, incorporating settlement agreements that 
require the restitution or seizure of objects. I will replace their main difference-in-difference 
framework in order to test the effects of court decisions from various timeframes in the sample 
periods on the market for art. My research will also delve into court rulings from both the US 
and the UK, creating a geographic comparison of the impact on markets between two different 
domestic judicial systems and histories. 
2.2 Auction Prices, Provenance, and the Auction Mechanism 
This paper builds upon studies of art valuation at auction, which have attempted to 
establish a system to explain how art is priced when competition between bidders and increased 
publicity drive prices up. Marinelli and Palomba (2011) created a pricing model for Italian 
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contemporary paintings at auction. The authors use a wider set of regressors as explanatory 
variables than previous literature, consider selection bias arising from unsold items, and a create 
model including presale evaluations by experts. The results show that there are four explanatory 
variables which determine the price of paintings. These include artist identity, physical attributes, 
artistic attributes, and sale characteristics. The explanatory variable “physical attributes” will 
manifest within my research as a variable denoting material. The main gap in this paper’s 
method is the lack of macroeconomic and wider art market trends in the empirical model. I will 
include a linear time trend and time trend quadratic to denote the effects of the most recent 
international recession and price trends over time. Most importantly, this paper suggests that 
provenance information quality is an important explanatory variable in the price regression and 
looks to establish the pertinence of an object’s ownership history to art valuation through its 
theoretical model.  
Provenance information has been recognized as an autoregulator of the antiquities 
market by authors from the fields of law, archaeology, and economics. Autoregulators are free-
market institutions that can solve or reduce information asymmetry problems. George Akerlof 
was the first to suggest that in markets of goods with uncertain quality, indicators of worth can 
autoregulate. Akerlof explores the problem of information asymmetry, which is observed in the 
relationship between auction houses and antiquities consumers (Akerlof, 1970). “Indefinite 
guarantees” of quality, such as unverified provenance, are harmful to businesses (Akerlof). 
Consumers are less likely to buy objects of uncertain quality than they are to buy objects of 
guaranteed quality. Peter Cannon-Brooks (1994) and Lisa Borodkin (1995) applied this line of 
thinking to the antiquities market (Brodie, 2014). Cannon-Brooks posits the idea that stolen 
property will be less attractive to consumers (Cannon-Brooks, 1994). This is because stolen 
goods are more difficult to offer at a high price in secondary sales, once other consumers are 
aware that the offered object is illegally possessed. Further, because of the simultaneous a) 
demand for antiquities with verifiable provenance and b) flood of antiquities with fake and 
unverifiable provenance on the market, Borodkin argues that customers will pay a premium for 
provenance (Borodkin, 1995). Antiquities’ provenance information problem is reflected in my 
theoretical model, which explains the relationship between price and provenance information 
quality.  
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In 1988, Abowd and Ashenfelter found that auctioneer’s estimate prices are actually 
better estimates of the price of art than a hedonic price function, which describes an equilibrium 
relationship between the characteristics of a product and its price. This model establishes price 
factors according to the premise that price is determined both by internal characteristics of the 
good being sold and external factors affecting it (Ashenfelter & Graddy, 2003). More recent 
research suggests a consistent bias towards upwards pricing of expensive paintings over a 30-
year period, clouding the true determinants of art prices in the market (Mei & Moses, 2005). 
Building upon these papers, this research will be able to determine whether court rulings, which 
are not directly related to the auctions themselves or the attributes of the work, will have an 
indirect impact on the prices at which objects are sold. 
In the past, long term and sparser auction data has been used to measure the direct and 
indirect impact of regulation or other legal and ethical control measures upon the antiquities 
trade. Authors conjecture that sales volumes shrink due to smaller material flows as more types 
of goods face restriction, and both auction houses and their customers act more cautiously in 
response to changes in market control measures (Brodie, 2019). Others question, however, the 
empirical support for a relationship between a reduction in sales volumes and increased market 
control, because international efforts have been disjointed and inequivalent in enforceability and 
stringency (2019). This paper supplies empirical evidence of a connection between court 
decisions and the quantity of materials at auction. I do this by using two new datasets of interest 
to economists, legal scholars, and cultural heritage experts. These datasets are explained in 
Section 5. An explanation of the data-scraping process, data organization, and instructions on 
collecting and manipulating the data are included in the online repository package.  
 
3. Background Information 
3.1 Legal Background and Art Law Landscape 
The market for art is an appropriate place to investigate the connection between law and 
economics, where policy and lawmakers can still improve adverse and inefficient market 
activities. The general connection between law and economics has been of concern to those in 
the field of cultural heritage protection who first look to institutionalized policy in order to 
hinder illicit trade, while simultaneously maintaining the international market for art. As Section 
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2 shows, however, most recent literature considers the mere adoption of laws rather than their 
implementation and effectiveness in the courts (Beltrametti & Marrone, 2016).  
Court rulings are just one way to enhance the effectiveness of a law but are worth further 
exploration. Legal scholars suggest that laws are more credible if they have been “executed” via 
citations and references in other court decisions (Levmore & Porat, 2014). Courts in both 
England and the United States have shown that they are willing to use criminal laws to convict 
people involved in money laundering via art, the illicit trade of antiquities, and the violation of 
foreign patrimony laws (Fincham, 2007). The International Foundation for Art Research lays out 
various types of legal grounds used in convictions between 1979 and today, including customs 
violations, illegal exportation and importation, theft, illegal excavation, breach of contract, and 
theft (IFAR Matrix, 2019). This paper will evaluate whether there is an impact on markets after 
ten types of these cases have been decided.  
The classes of legal concerns of use in this paper include choice of law, customs 
violations, declaratory action, illegal exportation and importation, in rem actions, replevin, stolen 
property, theft, title, and trafficking. Choice-of-law allows a court’s parties to agree that a 
particular jurisdiction’s laws will be used to interpret the case. Choice-of-law is especially 
common in cases involving foreign parties or objects and enables international or domestic law 
to be invoked in lower level courts. Customs violations and illegal exportation and importation 
are similar concepts, although customs violations have to do with goods moving across borders 
in general, while import and export laws have to do with items that will are intended to be sold 
crossing borders. The two types of actions included for analysis include in rem and declaratory 
action. In rem actions are lawsuits which particularly concern an object, and the parties’ title 
(right to own the object). Declaratory action does not dole out punishments but determines and 
uphold the rights of the parties involved in a contract. Title concerns property ownership and 
property rights, while replevin is a legal remedy which enables a person to reclaim stolen 
property. Stolen property and theft are also similar concepts, although someone can be tried for 
possessing stolen property even if they were unaware it was stolen at another point in time. 
Finally, trafficking describes a deal or trade in something illegal, so is a specific type of stolen 
property concern.  There is some clear overlap of classifications of the court cases included for 
analysis, but there remain distinctions between legal concerns which an analysis can attempt to 
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distinguish from one another. Table 1 serves as a reference and defines these legal concerns 
which will be used in the analysis.  
Some differences appear when we come to British and American responses to cultural 
heritage law and should be noted before discussing data. First, US and UK membership in the 
United Nations initially colored their treatment of cultural heritage objects in domestic courts. 
The 1970 United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property is a key international treaty in managing the illicit trade of 
ancient objects. Each signatory of the treaty agreed to design and enact national laws to seize 
illegally exported objects found in their territory and to repatriate them to their country of origin 




               (O’Malley et al., 2019) 
 
The treaty has been in effect for nearly fifty years, but many cultural heritage experts will argue 
that it has done little to manage theft, illicit trade, and the circulation of illegally possessed 
antiquities (Brodie, 2019). Beltrametti and Marrone merit the ineffectiveness to general 
underenforcement and difficulties enforcing sanctions when laws are breached (2016). One of 
the main difficulties with enforcement revolves around the right to ownership. The US has 
Legal Concern  Description 












in violation of statutes, regulations, or ordinances regulating the flow of goods sent to another country for 
sale (export) or goods brought into a country for sale (import)  
In rem action referring to a lawsuit or other legal action directed toward property, rather than toward a particular person 
Replevin under common law, the right to bring a lawsuit for recovery of goods improperly taken by another  
Stolen property the crime of possession of goods which one knows or which any reasonable person would realize were 
stolen. It is generally a felony. Innocent possession is not a crime, but the goods are generally returned to 
the legal owner. 
Theft the generic term for all crimes in which a person intentionally and fraudulently takes personal property of 
another without permission or consent and with the intent to convert it to the taker's use (including potential 
sale) 
Title ownership of property, which stands against the right of anyone else to claim the property  
Trafficking dealing or trading in something illegal  
Table 1 
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managed to capture better clarity and applicability in title and ownership law than the UK. 
Enforcement of the law perhaps does not always rely on legal precedent; this paper studies how, 
as more court decisions and settlements accumulate in each city over time, their causes and 
issues capture more institutional and public attention, dissuading auction houses from acting 
illegally or adversely. 
American federal statutes that handle claims to ownership of artwork include the 
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983, which reflects the requirements of 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and the National Stolen Property Act of 1948, as endorsed by 
United States vs. McClain (1979), a case convicting a group attempting to transport pre-
Columbian artifacts to the United States in violation of Mexico’s national ownership 
(Gerstenblith, 2009). Although domestic legislation surrounding limitations on the export of 
archaeological objects is increasing, American disputes over the rightful ownership of artworks 
are still incredibly complex. This is likely because cases involve overlapping fact patterns, 
multiple parties, and requirements of federal, state, and choice-of-law, which allows parties to 
apply foreign art ownership law in the US (Hoffman, 2006).  
The British context for handling claims to ownership is equally as complex, although 
sparser, in part because there are fewer avenues for legal recourse on issues such as ownership. 
The case decision from Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd. 
(2007) was highly significant. The case law firmly recognized the principle of foreign national 
ownership of antiquities, set a precedent based on the 1970 UNESCO Convention and finally 
harmonized previously unequal US and UK judicial approaches (Gerstenblith, 2009). With the 
US and the UK on similar footing in the legal contexts of cultural heritage and antiquities 
protections, it is appropriate to evaluate how court decisions in one country influence the amount 
of art offered (or the quality of information about that art) in the other country. The Court Data 
Timeline (Table 3) illustrates the uptick in case decisions in the past 5 years and the space for 
new research since Beltrametti and Marrone published the first drafts of their paper in 2015.  
I select legal decisions from databases of the International Foundation for Art Research 
(IFAR) and “Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime” (SHERLOC) from the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Cases from IFAR are specifically chosen from 
the matrix on Cultural Property (Antiquities) Disputes Over Non-United States Property 
(International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR)-Case Law, 2019). SHERLOC’s database on 
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Trafficking in Cultural Property in Britain, curated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, was created in addition to other legal categories to facilitate the dissemination of 
information regarding the implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Case Law Database, 2020). These two sources compile the most significant 
international cases in the art market from two diverse perspectives. The focus of the IFAR 
resource is the compilation of as many pending and complete cases regarding art and antiquities 
as possible. SHERLOC’s goal is to gather information on all types of pertinent international 
crime.  
It is important to note that the outcome of many of these cases is not highly punitive; the 
guilty or accused party might not pay a large fine or serve time in prison. As a result of Case 
Kingsbury, for example, the defendant plead guilty to charges relating to the fraudulent 
misrepresentation of provenance and only paid a £500 fine (Case Kingsbury, 2013). Despite the 
small magnitude of the punitive force of the guilty charge, cases which end in settlement instead 
of punitive results, can too, garner significant international and industry attention which can 
direct auction house and art consumer behaviors (Reyburn, 2019). For this reason, the analysis 
includes case law and decisions which were litigated at least once, but ultimately settled.  
3.2. Institutional Practices  
Most auction houses follow a relatively regular set of standards and rules at each art 
auction. A lot is the object or work at issue in a round of bidding. Each auction can contain 
anywhere from one to several hundred lots. Lots typically contain one single object, but some 
contain a group of related items. When an object is prepared for a sale, the auction house and the 
art’s owner agree to and sign conditions of business. A high and a low estimate are decided upon 
by a combination of art specialists and auctioneers. These estimates, material and condition 
reports, provenance entries, and images of the objects are typically published in catalogues 
which are circulated to interested parties before auction.  
When it is time to begin a sale, auctioneers take live, absentee, and telephone bids in 
increments. Still, some lots will fail to reach the reserve price. The reserve price is the minimum 
price at which a consignor allows the auction house to sell a work (Goldstein, 2012). Auction 
houses typically work to avoid this, ensuring consignors that their work will sell at auction with 
guarantees. This is done by finding a third-party who is willing to buy the work for above the 
reserve price regardless of what offers are made during the live sale. When a work does sell at 
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auction, it often only takes one to two minutes. When the auctioneer closes the sale, she drops 
her “hammer” on the podium, deciding the final selling or “hammer” price. 30 years ago, 
auctions were destinations to buy cheap art that you could later sell at a markup to consumers 
(Artsy, 2016). Today, these events are glamorous democratic contests, which are at once the 
most visible and perhaps the least understood or accessible type of transaction.  
The first major action against auction houses selling stolen antiquities can be honed to a 
specific event. In June 1995, Italian authorities recognized a marble torso of Artemis that had 
been stolen in 1988 from a convent in Naples. The subsequent sales of art collected by 
consignors such as Giacomo Medici (Sotheby’s) and Graham Geddes (Bonhams) brought 
adverse auction house practices into the light. (Brodie, 2014). The sale of illicit goods is not the 
only bad press for auction houses. Perhaps the most noteworthy auction house scandal involved 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s, who paid a collective $512 million in a settlement after the US Justice 
Department found evidence of a price-fixing scheme implemented between 1992 and 2000. This 
settlement also endorses this research’s decision to include settlement decisions.  
Like many other for-profit companies, the main motivation of auction house is the bottom 
line (Ulph, 2019). The Christie’s and Sotheby’s settlement, for example, not only dealt a short-
term financial blow, but drove away future consumers, who became more uncertain of the 
quality of services provided by the two top-tier houses. The motivation to hit the bottom line, the 
highest profit possible, has historically led to questionable ethical decisions on the individual lot 
level and in systematized selling practices. 
 
4. Data  
4.1 Auction Data 
Two datasets are used to determine if there is a connection between court decisions, 
prices, and the quality of provenance information. The first is the auction dataset and the second 
is the court dataset. I use auction data because auction houses curate a well-rounded set of 
information about each piece of art. This includes ownership history, an estimated price range, 
the sold price, and detailed material and condition information. Auction and art price data 
collection is a major boundary to art economics research. My auction information is collected via 
customized data-scraping with permissions from administrators at Sotheby’s and Bonhams.  
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The entire auction dataset includes 15,560 items sold between 2003 and 2019 at Bonhams 
and Sotheby’s. Between two and six auctions took place in each year. 11,175 of the lot 
observations classify as “antiquities” – they are either exclusively Roman (4,343), Greek (2,508), 
or Egyptian (4,179). I drop a lot from the sample if it as coded more than one of these types 
during scraping. Bonhams supplied the vast majority of observations from 53 auctions, which 
included 13,632 lots, all of which were sold in London. The remaining 2,058 lots were sold by 
Sotheby’s in a series of 28 auctions. Of the Sotheby’s lots, 1,877 were offered in New York. The 
fact that a greater number of observations are from London gained immediate attention. My data 
equips me to make determinations on in-country effects of court decisions more accurately than I 
can make determinations on cross-country effects.    
It is necessary to understand the art market context so that claims about price and 
provenance information quality changes can be made. The number of lots sold at auction per 
year spikes around 2013 and has since fallen on average. This trend mimics that found by 
Beltrametti and Marrone (2016). For approximately the last five years, the number of lots sold 
per year has been lower on average than every other year included in the sample (Figure 1). The 
late sample variation could reflect a larger trend among auction houses to shrink the size of 
auctions. I will explore whether this is explained by the industry reaction to tightening legal 
















All lots were sold in either antiquities-exclusive or non-exclusive antiquities auctions. 
Non-exclusive auctions are estate-based or thematic sales which can include other types of art, 
furniture, or objects which are not classified as antiquities alongside the Greek, Roman, and 
Egyptian objects of interest. These non-antiquities are retained for analysis in order to compare 
court decisions’ effects on antiquities versus non-antiquities. The variable takes a 0 value for 
non-antiquity lots. Each antiquity then earns classification into either Roman, Greek, or Egyptian 
categories through a source civilization variable. Figure 2 shows the trend lines for the 
provenance quality indicator of antiquities and non-antiquities. Until 2008, non-antiquities 
enjoyed better quality provenance on average than antiquities. The period from 2010-2015 saw a 
steady increase in the number of date entries per antiquity lot. In 2016, when the provenance 
information quality of non-antiquities dropped dramatically, the quality of antiquities’ 
information remained relatively stable. During this year, two high-profile illegal exportation and 
importation court decisions were litigated and completed, with defendants in each pleading 
guilty (US v. Chait, US v. Krizan). The Hobby Lobby case was also active during this period (US 
v. Four Hundred Fifty Ancient Cuneiform Tablets). 2016 also saw a general decline in the 
number of lots offered. Antiquities have an average of 0.82 date entries per lot, while non-
















These differences show that antiquities could respond to external factors, such as court decisions, 
differently than other types of art.  
Auctions from Sotheby’s and Bonhams receive in-person, phone, and pre-established 
bids for items sold sequentially in lots. Because auction houses strategically order the lots of an 
auction so as to maximize potential bids, I chose to collect all lots in the mechanized data scrape. 
Collecting all lots revealed similarities and differences between the first and second-tier auction 
houses. The data suggest that auction houses behave differently in response to external pressures. 
From the start of the sample until about 2015, it appears that New York was ahead of London in 
anticipating how much provenance information to offer (Figure 3). Until about 2014, both sale 
locations track their dates count growth in the same direction. 
I measure provenance information quality by the number of date entries included in each 
lot listing. These dates are stand-alone dates of a change in ownership or purchase; I chose not to 
scrape dates included in a previous owner’s lifespan or following the words “around”, “prior to” 
or “circa”. I find interesting variation in the average dates count. The fall in London’s average 
dates count between 2009 and 2011 comes during a period of increase number of antiquities 
sales. The steady increase from that point until 2018 shows Bonhams improving its provenance 
provision efforts for a smaller number of lots per sale. New York’s variation in provenance 
information quality looks slightly ahead of the London curve for most of the sample period. The 
dramatic drop and spike between 2014 and 2016 respectively coincide with a slight increase in 
lots sold per year by Sotheby’s and a subsequent steady decline in lots.   
Improvements in provenance information quality do not perfectly improve over time or 
as case law accumulates. As the number of lots sold per year has decreased on average in the last 
decade, London and New York auction houses appear to be paying closer attention to their 
provenance information. The rising quality of this information in London, especially, regardless 
of the lack of new court decisions made in the country from 2013 onwards, reflects institutional 
changes with regards to provenance, perhaps influenced by other factors either than court 
decisions. The data still motivate the relevance of New York court decisions during the court 
activity uptick between 2013 and 2019. Because of the difference in direction between London 
and New York provenance information provision, the data also indicate that institutional 
responses are directed by the type of case activity rather than its accumulation of court decisions 
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and legal pressure in later time periods. The timeline of court decisions is laid out in the decision 




The novel data paint a relationship between prices and provenance and suggest that 
variation in London prices could be explained by changes in New York case law. When omitting 
the top 1% of sales, we notice a positive relationship between price and the number of 
provenance date entries per lot. The top 1% of sales by sold price have an especially high 





Figure 5 Figure 6 
Figure 3 Figure 4 
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auctions. The average prices in London increase more steadily than price in New York, which 
experiences a sharp increase in average price starting in 2013. This increase coincides with 
nearly a 0.5 uptick in provenance dates offered per lot.  
New York auction houses typically offer more expensive items on average than London’s 
antiquities market, which is flooded with less expensive art. The average sold price in New York 
for the sample is $161,852 while the average sold price in London is £6,900. Both geographies 
see an uptick in prices in 2013. London’s sold prices experience there fastest rate of growth 
beginning in 2016. London’s provenance information quality improves in tandem, rising 
dramatically beginning in 2012 and leveling off in 2016.  
My data positions me best to investigate the variation in prices in London and New York 
as a result of shifts in provenance information provision and changing domestic legal schema. 
New York’s story is inherently different from London, and worth investigation, as Sotheby’s 
treatment of provenance and pricing may differ from Bonhams’.  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (New York) 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Sold Price 1,606 161,852.1 1,670,607.2 60.0 57,161,000.0 
 Sold (Yes=1) 1,784 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 
 # Date Entries 1,784 1.1 1.0 0.0 9.0 
 Age of Oldest 
Provenance 


















Descriptive Statistics (London) 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Sold Price 10,296 6,900.1 57,546.3 23.0 4,174,500.0 
 Sold (Yes=1) 14,025 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.0 
 # Date Entries 14,025 0.8 0.8 0.0 9.0 
 Age of Oldest 
Provenance 




















The pooled cross-sectional data is on the lot-level. The key dependent variables are sold 
price (!". $%!&	()*+,)	and the number of provenance date entries (!"#$%	'()*#). Each lot has an 
undisclosed reserve price, which, if not met at auction, means that the lot goes unsold. About 
28% of lots fail to meet the reserve price on the first try at auction (Gammon, 2018). My London 
Table 2 
 19 
data reflects this trend, with about 70% of lots selling at the first pass. Lots which failed to sell at 
their first auction do not take on a sold value of $0 but have the sold price omitted. The minimum 
estimate price and maximum estimate price are highly collinear with sold price, as expected. 
This information is still collected because Bonhams supplies only either the sold price or the 
estimate prices, depending on whether a lot was successfully sold or not. Sotheby’s, however, 
always provides the maximum and minimum estimates.  
The number of provenance dates counts the number four-digit sequences in each lot’s 
published provenance section. I am interested in verifiable dates of previous sales and 
transactions. Both older provenance and more recent evidence of sales and changes in ownership 
ensure that art is sold in good faith. I also collected age of oldest provenance (",$	(-!$%#	./(0)	, 
which is not used in my empirical strategy, but could help future studies evaluate whether 
provenance is considered higher quality if its recorded history is older.  
Key explanatory variables include antiquity (."/*01*/2), sale location (%"-$	-('"#1(*), 
auction house (ℎ%1$,), source civilization ($%1)+,), and material (4./,)*.!). Each lot is 
flagged as either an antiquity or not an antiquity through a dummy variable. Because the case 
law selected generally pertains to ancient objects, the prices of non-antiquities which are sold in 
antiquities-labeled auctions may be impacted less by the court decisions in question. The data 
limit our ability to determine this, however, because, for example, the non-antiquity items likely 
includes a combination of objects ranging from ancient Persian material and 18th century Italian 
art. In other words, the non-antiquity group is not the perfect group of non-ancient objects, and 
probably bear many similarities to antiquities.  
I include sale location because we expect selling objects in London to have a negative 
effect on the price of art, in part because buyers there are warier of UN regulations and 
susceptible to European cultural property law enforcements (Parkhouse, 2006). I include the 
control for auction house because the effects of court decisions on prices at Sotheby’s, a first-tier 
auction house that enjoys far more press and international attention than Bonhams, are likely to 
be greater. The data also show that Sotheby’s curates higher quality provenance information than 
Bonhams. We use source civilization to determine the difference between Roman, Greek, and 
Egyptian antiquities’ sold prices after court decisions have been reached. It is possible that the 
court decisions regarding Egyptian objects drive up the price of Egyptian goods, while having 
less of an effect on Greek and Roman objects. The eight materials controlled for in the model 
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comprise the only physical information about the objects. The materials I chose to collect are 
marble, alabaster, bronze, dionite, limestone, quartz, sandstone, terracotta, and wood.  
There are other limitations to the data sample. Auction results are published online by 
private companies. The data scraping mechanism is not perfect, nor are the auction houses, 
which have control over the information as principal. It is also possible that antiquities that raised 
concerns amongst specialists or drew public scrutiny for insufficient provenance were removed 
from the online public record. The lack of physical information is a limitation of this data due to 
the parameters of the data scraping process. It is likely that other factors such as size and 
condition contribution to valuation. Material was collected because consumers can still make 
value judgements on condition via knowledge of the material of an object. Antiquities could be 
more closely related to non-antiquities than I believe them to be. Limitations to the sample that 
arise from the decisions made during the data scraping process are further outlined in R 
markdown documents.  
4.2 Court Data 
Key independent variables of interest stem from the second of two compiled datasets, 
called the court dataset. The dataset includes 20 court decisions and settlements made in either 
London (5) or New York (15) between 2003 and 2019 published by IFAR or the UNODC. US 
and UK cases are divided into thirteen different classifications as organized by the two sources, 
as seen in Table 2. Settlements are only included for analysis if the case was litigated at one time 
or another. This approach differs from that of Beltrametti and Marrone, whose case law 
requirements include a conviction and “highly punitive” result. By this method, I will be able to 
determine during which legal time periods different types of decided court cases may have had 
the greatest effect.  
The timeline of court decisions (Table 3) displays the decisions made in each year from 
2003-2019. Three cases directly concern Egyptian objects, while the remainder of cases concern 
either an indeterminate combination of Greek, Roman, and Egyptian antiquities or an object 
from another source country including Iran, Iraq, Cambodia, Italy, and Ancient Mesopotamia. 
Five cases directly involve auction houses as a defendant, plaintiff, or potential intermediate 
seller of illegally obtained or possessed items. The other eleven cases were decided in New York 
or London but concern gallery owners or individual buyers, sellers, or intermediaries. These 
cases do not all pertain to Greek, Roman, or Egyptian antiquities specifically. They do, however, 
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pertain to ancient art and other antiquities. If the antiquity dummy variable shows a significant 
effect, we may be able to conclude that the laws which pertain to Greek, Roman, and Egyptian 
objects had a specific effect on objects from those source civilizations. If the results are 
insignificant, cases surrounding antiquities in general could have an indiscriminate effect on 
antiquities sales, or perhaps, on other types of auctioned art.  
 
* “Hobby Lobby” case. 
**Case began in New York and was moved to nearby Connecticut, so is retained for analysis. 
*** Cases also involve theft and title, but both fall under the broader “Trafficking London” variable  
****Case Name structure: Plaintiff v. Defendant 
 
Case Name(s) City Claims/Case Issue 
Variable (Total # 
Cases) 
Result 
In the Matter of Items Seized from the 
Park Ave. Armory 
New York Title (1) Litigated and 
settled 
NY v. Morano;  
US v. Khouli 
New York Trafficking (2) Guilty Plea; 
Guilty Plea 
People of NY v. Freedman New York Possession of Stolen 
Property (1) 
Guilty Plea 




US v. 10th Century Cambodian Statue New York In rem action (1) Litigated and 
settled 
US v. Chait; 
US v. Four Hundred Fifty Ancient 
Cuneiform Tablets* 
US v. Gordon 
US v. Johnson 
US v. Krizan 
US v. Liao 









US v. One Tyrannosaurus Bataar 
Skeleton 
New York Customs violation 
(1) 
Guilty Plea 
US v. Schultz New York Theft (1) Conviction 
Republic of Peru v. Yale University Connecticut** Replevin (1) Litigated, moved, 
settled 
Iran v. Barakat Galleries London Title (1) Judgement for 
Plaintiff**** 
Iran v. Berend London Choice-of-law (1) Judgement for 
Defendant 
Case Kingsbury; 
Winkworth v. Christie’s 
London Trafficking (2)*** Guilty Plea; 
Judgement for 
Defendant 




I create dummy variables denoting legal timeframes in order to track the effect of 
accumulating court decisions and to compare specific legal time periods to one another. The time 
period dummy variables are constructed in order to distribute lot observations as equally as 
possible across all case law time periods. Legal time periods in New York are divided into three 
dummy variables: a) 1 active decision (-"2	*31), b) 3-5 active decisions (-"2	*335), 4) 6-9 
active decisions (-"2	*369). Time periods in London are divided into two dummy variables: a) 1 
active decision (-"2	-(*1) and b) 4-5 active decisions (!"2	-(*45). These “active” decisions 
comprise the case law and settlements that have been determined and concluded by the judicial 
system. Each legal time period in both geographies is interacted with antiquity. There are some 
limitations to observations later in my sample period which limit my ability to evaluate the 
period from 2016 and forward in New York and London.  
I constructed the dummy variable denoting the New York time period with between 12-
13 active decisions (-"2	*31213),	with the intention of focusing on larger numbers of active 
court decisions. Because of the lack of observations from Sotheby’s in New York during this 
period, I am not able to evaluate the later stages of the case law timeframe there. This a 
timeframe which should be built upon in order to understand more recent trends in auction house 
behaviors and responses to court rulings in New York. I am unable to interact the period with 
between 6-9 decisions in New York with the antiquity variable, because no non-antiquity 
observations were made during this period. I also cannot evaluate the cross-country effect of the 
London period with 4-5 active decisions on New York prices and provenance information 
because of collinearity between the London variable and some observations of antiquities sold by 
Sotheby’s in the 6-9 active decision period. 
The selected case data allow me to investigate whether institutions react based on the 
pressure of accumulating cases. I am able to analyze specific cases and decisions to a lesser 
degree, since my data is organized on a yearly, not monthly, basis. Another concern moving 
forward is selection bias or omission bias. If I failed to include a court decision that imposed an 
especially harsh penalty against an auction house, for example, other certain legal time frame 
variables will gain significance. Further, I do not include any variables regarding international 
legislation, directives, or regulation in this analysis. I will pay close attention to time trend 




















 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total
Egyptian Objects US v Schultz (NY) US v. Johnson (NY)
US v. Khouli (NY); 
Case Kingsbury (LON) 4
Auction House 
Involvement Iran v. Berend (LON)
Winkworth v. Christies 
(LON); Kurtha v. Marks 
(LON)
US v. Cambodian 
Statue (NY) US v. Tyr. Skeleton (NY) 5
Other Iran v. Barakat (LON)
Republic of Peru 
v. Yale 
University 
(CONN) NY v. Freedman (NY) US v. Gordon (NY) US v. Liao (NY)
US v. Chait 
(NY); US v. 
Krizan (NY)
US v. Cuneiform 
Tablets (NY); NY v. 
Morano (NY); 
Sidon Bull's Head 
(The Met) (NY) Park Ave. Armory (NY) 11
Total 1 2 3 1 4 2 1 2 3 1 0 20
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These cases also deal with different types of objects and actors. As I look to determine 
the effect of the court decisions on antiquities versus on non-antiquities, I should keep in mind 
that the minority of cases in the sample period actually deal directly with Roman, Greek, or 
Egyptian objects, but with auction houses or art galleries or other types of ancient objects. One 
reason for this limitation is that important court decisions were established on Classical (Roman 
and Greek) antiquities in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas other types of ancient art are seeing new 
legal attention. 
There are many other types of legal concerns which can indirectly affect art prices, such 
as money laundering cases, which are often of concern to auction houses, buyers, and sellers. As 
art and art owners are more frequently involved in litigation, it is likely that a wider variety of 
decisions will affect the market for art and auction house activity. I am better poised to 
investigate the in-country effects of court decisions that I am the cross-country effects. I still look 
to include certain cross-country variables in ultimate regression models, having first studied 
variations in pricing and provenance information quality with in-country variables. I include 
these cross-country variables because the data shows a potential relationship between New York 
court decisions and the number of lots offered in London.  
 
5. Theoretical Model: Provenance Premium   
The relationship between price and provenance illuminates how legal decisions connect 
to the behaviors of auction houses, buyers, and sellers. This section begins to lay out the 
complicated framework of decisions made by sellers, buyers, and auction houses which might 
keep objects, even those with well-documented provenance, from sale at auction. I use a simple 
supply and demand model in which a domestic art market is shocked by case law, regulation, or 
a law which requires an increase in provenance quality. This shock motivates the existence of the 
premium that consumers are willing to pay for improved provenance information.  
The actors of interest for this supply-demand framework include buyers, sellers of art 
who contract with auction houses, and the auction houses themselves, acting as market-making 
intermediaries. Let us assume that the sold price is partially driven by how these sellers and 
buyers react to increases or decreases in the quality of provenance information of an object. 
Buyers want higher quality provenance information and to pay a certain price (or within a range), 
while sellers want to earn the highest amount possible at auction. The quality of provenance 
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information is measured by both the age of the oldest provenance the number of provenance 
dates provided. The auction house both a) acts as a filter of this information and b) exercises 
control as to how much provenance information is provided to sellers before auctions take place. 
If dates of previous sales between individuals, from galleries, or other auction houses are 
recorded, well-curated, and provided to buyers, the consumers of antiquities will be more willing 
to pay higher amounts. A large part of the reason why provenance, and veritable dates of 
exchange in particular, are especially important in today’s art market economy is that modern 
legislation and case law require provenance before a certain date to ensure that antiquities were 
removed from their source country legally. For example, auction houses and other sellers have 
found it increasingly difficult to sell goods without provenance information dating prior to the 
adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Brodie, 2014). Having 
veritable provenance is also important for art’s future sale. Many art consumers view art as an 
investment which can be resold at a profit.  
If auction houses provide better quality historical and ownership information on one or a 
group of antiquities, the buyers’ demand curve for such antiquities shifts to the right (Figure 7). 
This is because, all else equal, consumers seek out higher quality provenance information as a 
signal of antiquity quality. For some consumers, this shift might mean the difference between a 
willingness to purchase no antiquities at auction and one antiquity at auction. The lack of good 
quality information on an antiquity is a transactional barrier and a legal risk for buyers.  
There are various reasons why sellers might choose to sell items with poor or high quality 
provenance information, even in the face of legislation or precedent requiring certain quality of 
information. Let us imagine a seller considering bringing her objects to auction. The seller owns 
an object with poorly-documented provenance. The seller’s first decision is whether or not to 
attempt to reach a selling agreement with an auction house. If the seller feels that she will gain 
more by selling the object now than by holding onto the object, she might approach an auction 
house, regardless of the provenance information quality. In the face of increasing legal 
restrictions, however, if there are few verifiable dates of provenance which meet requirements, 
she may choose to keep the object in fear of facing legal action. Even if good quality information 
did exist, however, auction houses can choose not to provide it to potential customers or do not 
possess the necessary resources to access that information.  
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Auction houses face limitations to how much information they can collect based on time 
constraints, access to international resources, non-digital evidence of ownership, the number of 
live previous owners, and trustworthiness of previously established provenance, among other 
barriers. The actions of sellers do have a large impact on provenance quality before auction 
houses can gain access to an object, but auctions houses also might choose not to provide that 
information if it sheds light on previous illegal ownership of the object, for example, which 
could help restore the artwork to a rightful owner. The auction house decides whether to have 
lower or higher standards for provenance information. The auction house can conduct quality 
control. Auction houses might reject an object for sale if they believe that it does not meet their 
provenance requirements or if their sale of the object could put the auction house in risky legal 
territory.  
Buyers observe the standards set by auction houses and weigh the net benefits of 
purchasing, for example, an object with lower-quality provenance information versus one with 
higher-quality provenance information. If, in the worst-case scenario, an object had unverifiable 
provenance and was illegally possessed, the sale of an illegal object will have been facilitated by 
an auction house and will have landed in the hands of a new owner. Two more parties, the 
auction house and the buyer, have been added to a list of involved actors in the possession of and 
transaction involving an illegal object.  
When laws and court decisions become more stringent with their requirements for 
veritable provenance, prices will subsequently rise because consumers will pay a premium for 
provenance information in order to avoid legal trouble. The quantity of antiquities at auction, 
however, could fall. Antiquities which do not meet the new provenance information benchmarks 
will not be allowed at auction or in other sales. The other option is that if a good does not have 
the necessary provenance information, owners decide to sell it on the black market. These 
antiquities leave the “supply” section of the supply and demand model, causing the supply curve 
to shift to the left.  
The quantity of antiquities in one country could be shrinking because international 
auction houses are inviting sellers’ object elsewhere. Sellers could choose to sell their objects in 
a country with fewer regulations around art and antiquities. Auction houses could choose to 
encourage sellers to offer their art where it can sell at higher prices and with less legal risk. For 
instance, Sotheby’s rerouted the majority of its antiquities sales to New York after a series of 
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embarrassing illegal sales of illicitly exported, excavated, and acquired goods in London (Brodie, 
2014b). Another more recent development is that New York auction houses face increasing 
pressure from accumulating court decisions, especially due to court activity and the possibility of 
legal action brought by the new Antiquities Trafficking Unit of the U.S. District Attorney’s 
office, deployed in 2017. These pressures could drive sales of objects with uncertain or illegal 
histories out of the New York auction house spotlight and back to London, where we also find 
demand for antiquities with or without well-documented and veritable history. 
 The rise in prices of antiquities but indeterminate change in quantity of antiquities 
provides a fraction of the complicated picture of auction house activity and behavior. I explore 
the theory that the price of a good is responsive to the quality of provenance information based 
















6. Empirical Model and Strategy 
6.1 Court Decisions and Provenance Information Quality 
I employ a three-part strategy with split London and New York samples to capture the 
effect of court decisions on prices and provenance. I first run regressions of court decisions from 
New York and London on the provenance quality measures in each city respectively (1). I am 
Figure 7 
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most interested in the direct effects of the antiquity variable and the court decision time periods. I 
then treat the sold price as the dependent variable and use provenance quality as an independent 
variable in addition to sale location and auction house controls (2). The third round of 
regressions tests the direct effect of court decision variables on prices (3). The goals of the 
empirical models are to determine if and how court decisions affect prices directly or via 
provenance quality, and whether Greek, Roman, and Egyptian antiquities have special trends or 
are affected by court decisions differently than other types of art. I include New York court 
decision variables in the London sample’s regression and London court decision variables in the 
New York sample’s regression in order to investigate the cross-country legal effect. 
 Let ! index the individual lot, " index the time, and let # denote auction house. The 
variables of interest on the right-hand-side of the equation are the time period variables for active 
New York court decisions. I use variables denoting the time period instead of a cumulative 
continuous variable because I believe that provenance information quality will respond directly 
to periods in which specific decisions were made rather than to an accumulation of nondescript 
cases. These discrete court decision variables allow for a nonlinear relationship between the 
number of active court decisions and the effects on provenance quality information and price.  
 I attempt to show whether antiquities’ provenance is impacted differently by the court 
decisions from non-antiquities. The only variable in the London sample regression that is not 
mirrored in the New York regression is the variable for auction house, which controls for the 
unobserved heterogeneity between Sotheby’s and Bonhams in London. I incorporate cross-
country decision timeframe variables (%&'	)*1, %&'	)*35, %&'	)*69, %&'	%1)1) to get a sense 
of the direction and magnitude of potential cross-country judicial influences. I run these 




(1) Provenance and Court Decisions in New York 
 
!"#$%	'()*#!" = +#+ +$"*#,-),#.! + +%#,/$	#0$*!" + +&#,/$	#0$*!"% ++'2"3	*.1!" +
+(2"3	*.35!" +	+)2"3	*.69!" + "*#,-),#.! ∗ (+*2"3	*.1!" +	++2"3	*.35!") +




6.2 Provenance Information Quality and Sold Price 
The second phase regresses the natural log of the sold price on provenance quality 
measure, 3&"45	617)"!. I use the natural log in order to ease analysis between the two currencies 
at play, GBP and USD. As discussed in the theoretical model, I hypothesize that an increase in 
the quality of provenance information increases transparency about object quality and shifts the 
demand curve to the right, causing prices to rise. The regression includes controls for auction 
house, sale location, a time trend, materials, and source civilization. If Equation 1 shows that 
court decisions have a significant effect on provenance information quality and if Equation 2 
shows that the number of date entries per lot has a significant effect on its sold price, we could 
conclude that court decisions impact prices via provenance information. If not, however, I still 
want to determine the effect of case law on prices directly in the third stage. 
 
 
6.3 Court Decisions and Sold Price 
I set up Equation 3 using the natural log of the sold price as the dependent variable, 
excluding all provenance information quality variables, while including the same variables and 
variable interactions as Equation 1. My primary variables of interest are the antiquity and court 
decision variables from New York and London. Once again, I investigate the effect of court 
decisions on cross-country prices.  
I have suggested that Sotheby’s and Bonhams change their institutional behaviors in 
response to court decisions made in New York or London. I used the provenance information 
quality variable as my main measure of institutional behavior in Equation 1. If I find that 
Provenance and Court Decisions in London 
 
 
!"#$%	'()*#!"# =	,$ +	,%"*#./).#0! 	+ 	,&#.1$	#2$*!# + ,'#.1$	#2$*!#& + ,(ℎ()%$" +
,)4"5	4(*1!# + ,*4"5	4(*45!# + "*#./).#0! ∗ (,+4"5	4(*1!# + ,,4"5	4(*45!#) +
,-1"#$2."4%!+ ,%$%()2'$	'.<! +,%%4"5	*01!# + ,%&4"5	*035!# +	,%'4"5	*069!# + 	@!"# 
(2) Prices and  Provenance  
!". $%!&	()*+,!"# = -$+ -%&./,$	+%0"/! +-&."/*10*/2!  + -'/*3,	/),"&# + -(/*3,	/),"&#& 
+-)ℎ%0$," +	-*$.!,	!%+./*%"! + 		-+3./,)*.!$!+ -,$%0)+,	+*6! + 7!"# 
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provenance information is not impacted by court decisions, however, the model is constructed 
such that I can still make determinations on institutional behavior based on the significance of 
court variables in Equation 3. This particular method of integrating court decisions into the 
regression carries the assumption that each case has the same marginal effect. Cases have been 
honed based on geographical jurisdiction and a once-litigated requirement in order to make this 
assumption. However, it is a limitation of my strategy that I assume the same effect of the 
precedence of each court decision or private settlement. I did not measure how harsh the 
punishment was for each case. It is difficult to differentiate the effect of each individual case 
without a month by month analysis of changes to prices and provenance. The interpretation of 
the linear and quadratic time trends will help us determine how prices are shifting across the art 
and antiquities markets over time, aside from the legal effects. This is an important macro-level 




Previous empirical literature has addressed endogeneity when dealing with treaties and 
situations involving ratification of or compliance with international law (Landman, 2005, p.231; 
Simmons, 2010, p.290). If I left a variable out of the model or failed to recognize another source 
of heterogeneity besides the differences between auction houses, this will produce an 
endogeneity bias. I am careful not to include possible endogenous variables in the models, nor to 
(3) Prices and Court Decisions in New York  
 
!". $%!&	()*+,!" = .#+ .$/"0*12*03!+ .%0*4,	0),"&" + .&0*4,	0),"&"% +
.'!/6	"31!" + .(!/6	"335!" +	.)!/6	"369!" + /"0*12*03! ∗ (.*!/6	"31!" +
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Prices and Court Decisions in London 
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let the estimated or sold prices influence the provenance information quality. In foreseeing other 
possible biases, it is still possible that I could overestimate the effect of case law and provenance 
on the price of art if I omitted an important case from my analysis or fail to realize larger 
contextual variation in the marketplace through the time trends or auction house.  
Other relevant variables for future consideration include more time-specific factors. The 
lagged effect of each type of case law may be included, as well as a binary variable denoting 
whether one type of case law has exceeded a specific number of rulings in order to find a 
benchmark number at which case law is most influential over prices. Additional variables could 
include source country corruption or political unrest. One hypothesis driving this addition is that 
political unrest in a source country could lead to worse–incomplete, damaged, or lost–
provenance history of an object. Sotheby’s and Bonhams also provide a condition report for each 
lot, which is collected in my customized data scrape. The number of characters or words per lot’s 
condition report could be included, as condition reports include mostly negative information. 
 
7. Results  
7.1 Provenance and Court Decisions  
The results in Table 5 and Table 6 show an attempt to understand the variation in the 
number of provenance date entries per lot. In Table 5, I focus on the direct effects of the 
antiquity dummy variable and the New York court decision timeframes. The antiquity dummy 
variable does not show a significant difference in the quality of provenance information between 
antiquities and non-antiquities in the New York Sample. The lack of information on this 
difference could be due to a limitation of the sample in comparing the two types. The time trend 
shows a stable increase in the number of date entries within the New York sample, although the 
quadratic effect is negative. The number of entries per lot per year is rising by 0.4 on average.  
 The court decision timeframes display significant and positive direct effects, which 
increases with the number of active decisions in Model 3. Observations within the timeframe of 
1 active case have an average of 0.165 more date entries than those within the timeframe with 
zero active decisions. The 3-5 active decision timeframe gains about 0.10 date entries over this 
period. The time period in which 6-9 cases are active in New York maintains significance in the 
face of additional variables describing material traits. Model 6 suggests that this period saw 
objects gain an average of one additional provenance date over the period with zero active 
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decisions. A joint F-test suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis that either interaction with 
antiquity has a coefficient equal to zero.  
Our information on materials shows that provenance information quality is significantly 
worse for some materials than others, on average. As expected, wooden objects have the highest 
significance for a smaller number of date entries per lot compared to marble objects. This could 
be because wooden items simply do not last as long as last in as good of condition as sturdier 
pieces made of stone. Quartz, bronze, and alabaster objects also have significantly fewer date 
entries than marble objects. The source civilization does not appear to have an effect on the 
number of provenance date entries but will be reinvestigated when price assumes the role of the 
dependent variable. The single variable included for cross-country legal effects on New York 
provenance quality is also insignificant.  
Table 6 makes the same effort as Table 5, but for the London sample. There are 4,700 
observations of use in each regression. Like the New York sample, the antiquity variable does 
not have significance. This leads me to investigate the effects of court decisions directly on 
provenance. The coefficients on the London court decision variables lack stability and eventually 
fluctuate between positive and negative effects. In Model 3, the timeframe variable in which 4-5 
court decisions are active has an average of 0.24 more date entries per lot than the period with 
zero active decisions, while the period with 1 active case looks to have fewer entries on average 
than the period with zero active decisions. The sign of the period with 1 active decision is not 
significant in the complete model, which includes material and source civilization controls. The 
4-5 active decisions timeframe has a greater impact on antiquities than it does on non-antiquities. 
The results suggest that the timeframe with 4-5 active case entries led to a 0.478 increase in date 
entries per lot for non-antiquities and a 0.699 increase in date entries per lot for antiquities, 
compared to the period with no active cases.  
The time trend shows a small decrease in the number of date entries within the sample 
over time in London. This is opposite the New York regression. The number of dates has 
decreased by about 0.09 entries per year on average with time. The time trend’s quadratic effect 
is significant but small in its positive magnitude. The data, which overall show an average 




Table 5: Provenance and Court Decisions in New York  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
    Dates Count Dates Count Dates Count Dates Count Dates Count Dates Count Dates Count 
 Antiquity 0.077 0.021  0.005 0.064 -0.186 -0.186 
   (0.330) (0.344)  (0.349) (0.443) (0.447) (0.451) 
 timetrend  0.111*  0.491*** 0.491*** 0.473*** 0.405* 
    (0.066)  (0.144) (0.145) (0.147) (0.212) 
 timetrend * timetrend  -0.005  -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.028** 
    (0.004)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
 1 Decision NY   0.165** -0.203 -0.012 -0.261 -0.165 
     (0.083) (0.209) (0.855) (0.851) (0.875) 
 3-5 Decisions NY   0.264** 0.304 0.186 -0.093 -0.033 
     (0.117) (0.294) (0.524) (0.539) (0.552) 
 6-9 Decisions NY   0.390** 0.884** 0.880** 1.017** 1.046** 
     (0.158) (0.387) (0.387) (0.400) (0.406) 
 1 Decision NY * Antiquity     -0.194 0.087 0.092 
       (0.837) (0.838) (0.836) 
 3-5 Decisions NY * 
Antiquity 
    0.116 0.435 0.449 
       (0.456) (0.468) (0.475) 
 Materials (0=Marble)        
          
 Alabaster      -0.371** -0.363* 
        (0.186) (0.188) 
 Bronze      -0.181* -0.180* 
        (0.102) (0.102) 
 Dionite      -0.139 -0.144 
        (0.212) (0.214) 
 Limestone      0.088 0.087 
        (0.164) (0.164) 
 Quartz      -0.602* -0.606* 
        (0.332) (0.332) 
 Sandstone      -0.235 -0.235 
        (0.265) (0.265) 
 Terracotta      -0.124 -0.127 
        (0.157) (0.157) 
 Wood      -0.494*** -0.496*** 
        (0.159) (0.159) 
 Source Civilization 
(0=Egyptian) 
       
          
 Roman      -0.072 -0.070 
        (0.112) (0.113) 
 Greek      -0.080 -0.076 
        (0.136) (0.136) 
 1 Decision LON       0.103 
         (0.213) 
 _cons 1.125*** 0.666* 1.051*** -0.374 -0.431 0.034 0.211 
   (0.328) (0.399) (0.062) (0.549) (0.618) (0.625) (0.760) 
 Obs. 821 821 821 821 821 821 821 
 R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.010 0.020 0.021 0.038 0.038 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  















 Table 6: Provenance and Court Decisions in London 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 














 Antiquity 0.104 0.022  0.012 -0.092 -0.084 -0.081 
   (0.064) (0.064)  (0.064) (0.093) (0.098) (0.097) 
 timetrend  -0.052***  -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.073*** 
    (0.008)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
 timetrend * timetrend  0.006***  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Auc. House  -0.117  -0.128* -0.126* -0.119 -0.000 
    (0.075)  (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.082) 
 1 Decision LON   -0.106*** 0.038 0.016 0.007 0.009 
     (0.037) (0.049) (0.264) (0.263) (0.263) 
 4-5 Decisions LON   0.245*** 0.197*** -0.024 -0.010 0.478* 
     (0.024) (0.062) (0.138) (0.141) (0.244) 
 1 Decision LON * 
Antiquity 
    0.024 0.031 0.032 
       (0.265) (0.264) (0.264) 
 4-5 Decisions LON * 
Antiquity 
    0.226* 0.211 0.221* 
       (0.129) (0.133) (0.133) 
 Materials (0=Marble)        
          
Alabaster      0.046 0.046 
        (0.064) (0.063) 
Bronze      0.016 0.015 
        (0.038) (0.038) 
Dionite      0.128 0.144 
        (0.128) (0.128) 
Limestone      -0.020 -0.028 
        (0.056) (0.056) 
Quartz      0.289 0.285 
        (0.239) (0.241) 
Sandstone      -0.159 -0.157 
        (0.113) (0.114) 
Terracotta      -0.068 -0.067 
        (0.044) (0.043) 
Wood      -0.019 -0.026 
        (0.059) (0.059) 
Source Civilization 
(0=Egyptian) 
       
          
Roman      -0.014 -0.015 
        (0.037) (0.037) 
Greek      0.038 0.038 
        (0.043) (0.042) 
 1 Decision NY       -0.417** 
         (0.168) 
 3-5 Decisions NY       -0.342*** 
         (0.129) 
 6-9 Decisions NY       0.064 
         (0.088) 
 _cons 0.724*** 0.845*** 0.664*** 0.922*** 1.021*** 1.015*** 0.874*** 
   (0.062) (0.101) (0.017) (0.103) (0.122) (0.134) (0.137) 
 Obs. 4700 4700 4700 4700 4700 4700 4700 
 R-squared 0.000 0.067 0.021 0.068 0.069 0.071 0.078 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 35 
The cross-country effect on provenance from New York to London is negative and significant 
for each timeframe except the timeframe with between 6-9 active court decisions. The earliest 
timeframe, in which 1 decision is active, has the greatest magnitude effect.  
The effect of New York court decisions on provenance information quality in London 
could be negative for a number of reasons. One possibility is that in response to early court 
decisions in New York, Bonhams and Sotheby’s flooded their auctions with lower cost items, 
which often come with fewer provenance date entries, in order to avoid attention on objects for 
sale from the press and law enforcement. Bonhams, for example, has been known to flood their 
auctions with a multitude of lower priced items instead of focusing their resources on auctioning 
off higher-earning, attention-garnering, lots. 
 
7.2 Prices and Provenance  
Table 7 explores the relationship between provenance information quality and sold 
prices. The sample is limited to 2,171 observations, because I only consider objects which sold 
and have some provenance information. I am able to learn more about the direct relationship 
between provenance information quality and prices in New York and London. There is a positive 
relationship between information quality and price. Even once I account for material 
characteristics, which explain a large portion of price variation, the model estimates that for each 
additional date entry, the price increases by an average of 17%.  
The direct effect of being an antiquity—an Egyptian, Roman, or Greek object—also has a 
significantly positive effect on prices. When I break this down further and compare Egyptian, 
Roman, and Greek objects, I do not find a significant difference in prices throughout the sample.  
The effect of time on prices has a positive effect. Model 4 shows a significant 6% 
increase in the price of lots per year. The sale location and the auction house have strongly 
significant effects on the price. An item from the sample sold at Bonhams yields less at auction 
than an item sold at Sotheby’s. Given the distribution of the sample and the fact that most of my 
observations are sold by Bonhams in London, it is not surprising that items sold in London go for 
significantly less at auction than the items sold in New York.  
An important takeaway from this table is the importance of physical characteristics in 
explaining the variation in art prices. Every material variable included in the regression sells for 
significantly less than objects which are marble. The results report that nearly 10% more of the 
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variation in price is explained by the inclusion of these variables. Future efforts should include 
more optionality for material and consider how best to model the physical qualities of art.  
Results confirm the complex structure of art valuation. Having explored the direct effects of 
court decisions on provenance (Table 5, Table 6) and the effects of provenance information 
quality and antiquity on prices (Table 7), the final regression effort looks to understand the direct 
effects of court decisions on prices.  
 
Table 7: Prices and Provenance (New York and London) 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 








 # Prov Entries 0.379*** 0.375*** 0.360*** 0.222*** 0.174*** 
   (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.040) (0.037) 
 Antiquity  0.648** 0.605** 0.400* 0.088 
    (0.296) (0.291) (0.241) (0.216) 
 timetrend   0.176*** 0.062* 0.021 
     (0.041) (0.033) (0.029) 
 timetrend * timetrend   -0.009*** -0.002 0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Auc. House    -2.110*** -1.584*** 
      (0.107) (0.111) 
 Sale Location    -0.462*** -0.749*** 
      (0.128) (0.125) 
Materials (0=Marble)      
        
 Alabaster     -0.968*** 
       (0.151) 
 Bronze     -1.172*** 
       (0.085) 
 Dionite     -0.451** 
       (0.186) 
 Limestone     -0.576*** 
       (0.119) 
 Quartz     -0.492** 
       (0.246) 
 Sandstone     -0.806*** 
       (0.288) 
 Terracotta     -1.692*** 
       (0.094) 
 Wood     -0.662*** 
       (0.140) 
Source Civilization 
(0=Egyptian) 
     
        
 Roman     -0.037 
       (0.080) 
 Greek     0.099 
       (0.098) 
 _cons 8.319*** 7.685*** 7.017*** 9.534*** 10.671*** 
   (0.088) (0.301) (0.332) (0.284) (0.282) 
 Obs. 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 
 R-squared 0.030 0.032 0.040 0.439 0.532 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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7.3 Prices and Court Decisions 
It is clear from Tables 5 and 6 that I cannot expect court decisions to perfectly instrument 
for provenance information quality. I can still evaluate the direct effect on price from court 
decision variables in split New York and London samples. Table 8 uses a New York sample. I 
find that the New York timeframes in which between 3-5 and 6-9 court decisions were active are 
significantly different than the timeframe in which zero cases were active.  
The period in which 3-5 cases were active covered 2010 through 2013, a time in which 
New York process were experiencing a sharp uptick (Figure 6). I cannot accurately distinguish 
between the effects of Republic of Peru v. Yale, US v. Khouli, US v. Cambodian Statue, or NY v. 
Freedman during this period, but we could keep track of each case’s legal concern and outcome. 
The interaction term of antiquity and the period with 3-5 active cases is significant and shows a 
smaller effect on antiquities than on non-antiquities. This could be because the cases of this 
period did not all focus on antiquities themselves or concern auction houses. The following time 
period, though, with a greater number of active decisions, shows a better effect of the 
accumulation of court decisions.  
The period in which 6-9 cases were active covered 2014 through 2015. In an 
unobstructed view, Model 3 shows a negative effect of the period on prices. Prices were 
increasing on average in this period, but at a lesser rate than in the period with 3-5 active 
decisions. One case within this period concerned a customs violation. The other two concerned 
objects illegally imported to the United States. In the fuller model, which includes material 
characteristics, the variable is significant at the 95% level, and has a positive effect on prices. 
The instability of some of the court decision variable’s signs is a challenge to the interpretation.  
Material variables maintain similar degrees of significance to Table 7. The cross-country 
effect that I capture is negative. The period in which 1 court decision is active in London 
captures the period from 2007-2008. Unfortunately, the structure of my court data does not allow 
me to distinguish between the difference in effects of the two cases that took place in 2007, Iran 
v. Barakat and Iran v. Berend. There are a few reasons why the cross-country effect could be so 
strongly negative from London to New York. Buyers in New York could have observed the 
results of an Iran case in London and steered away from buying higher ticket and higher profile 
items with questionable provenance, which garner the attention of the public, press, illicit 
trafficking agents, and law enforcement. New York auction houses could have also chosen not to 
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accept seller’s expensive items or to set estimates on antiquities lower in response to increased 
scrutiny on object sold by galleries and auction houses. Despite the smaller size of the New York 
sample and the instability of some of the timeframe variables, it is the timeframes with greater 
numbers of cases that show a significant difference from the timeframe with zero cases.  
Table 9 shows that the time trend for London prices is consistently positive, although at a 
smaller magnitude than for the New York sample. This follows the price trends shown in Figures 
5 and 6. The direct effect of being labeled an antiquity is positive, like in Table 7. However, the 
models show no special change in price after decisions have been made for antiquities compared 
to non-antiquities; the robust standard errors are larger than the coefficient.  
The domestic court decision variables also have a positive effect on price and are highly 
significant when I omit other variables. The period with 4-5 active decisions in London returns 
unstable coefficients but shows a positive effect on prices when significant. The period in which 
between 4-5 court decisions are active in London is 2008 through 2013. This latter period 
maintains significance in the fullest model. Although the material results look somewhat similar 
to the New York results in Table 8, the source variables return a new significant effect of an 
antiquity being “Roman” on price. Roman objects of the sample sell for 13.5% less than 
Egyptian objects on average in London.  
The cross-country effects of international court decisions are, once again, negative in 
Model 7. I must evaluate these variables conservatively, given the timeframes implied by each. 
The period with one active case covers five years of time, while the period with between 3-5 
active cases covers four years and the period with between 6-9 cases only covers 2 years. It is 
still interesting to consider, however, how one New York case, such as Schultz (2003), could 
have signaled to international auction houses that they should avoid offering higher priced 
objects which could come under public scrutiny or legal action for insufficient provenance 
information. Sellers could also be afraid to offer their high-value antiquities at auction. Buyers 






Table 8: Prices and Court Decisions in New York  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 












 Antiquity 0.602 0.554  0.565 1.011 0.799 0.886 
   (0.813) (0.823)  (0.815) (1.310) (1.241) (1.220) 
 timetrend  0.333***  0.650*** 0.658*** 0.615*** 1.112*** 
    (0.102)  (0.239) (0.240) (0.229) (0.294) 
 timetrend * timetrend  -0.022***  -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.075*** 
    (0.007)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
 1 Decision NY   0.175 -0.058 0.055 -0.160 -0.752 
     (0.128) (0.310) (1.666) (1.333) (1.362) 
 3-5 Decisions NY   0.116 0.728* 3.159** 2.479* 2.145 
     (0.174) (0.422) (1.381) (1.312) (1.306) 
 6-9 Decision NY   -0.461* 0.936 0.963* 1.117** 0.924 
     (0.236) (0.570) (0.572) (0.566) (0.567) 
 1 Decisions NY * 
Antiquity 
    -0.115 0.036 -0.102 
       (1.632) (1.299) (1.294) 
 3-5 Decisions NY * 
Antiquity 
    -2.436* -1.875 -2.071* 
       (1.314) (1.250) (1.227) 
Materials (0=Marble)        
          
Alabaster      -1.062*** -1.121*** 
        (0.337) (0.341) 
Bronze      -0.970*** -0.974*** 
        (0.158) (0.158) 
Dionite      -0.204 -0.159 
        (0.264) (0.265) 
Limestone      -0.538** -0.529** 
        (0.220) (0.220) 
Quartz      -1.662*** -1.613*** 
        (0.446) (0.457) 
Sandstone      -1.347*** -1.361*** 
        (0.267) (0.261) 
Terracotta      -1.839*** -1.832*** 
        (0.238) (0.231) 
Wood      -0.948*** -0.935*** 
        (0.291) (0.291) 
Source Civilization 
(0=Egyptian) 
       
          
Roman      -0.244 -0.263 
        (0.173) (0.174) 
Greek      0.268 0.236 
        (0.202) (0.205) 
1 Decision LON       -0.776*** 
         (0.295) 
 _cons 9.898*** 8.908*** 10.410*** 8.054*** 7.594*** 8.614*** 7.221*** 
   (0.811) (0.892) (0.098) (1.034) (1.417) (1.357) (1.404) 
 Obs. 719 719 719 719 719 719 719 
 R-squared 0.001 0.017 0.009 0.027 0.029 0.130 0.137 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  







Table 9: Prices and Court Decisions in London 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 












 Antiquity 0.678*** 0.351***  0.357*** 0.253 -0.043 -0.052 
   (0.138) (0.135)  (0.131) (0.197) (0.200) (0.201) 
 timetrend  0.182***  0.102*** 0.103*** 0.055** 0.119*** 
    (0.016)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) 
 timetrend * timetrend  -0.006***  -0.003** -0.003** 0.000 -0.011*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Auc. House  -2.009***  -2.015*** -2.013*** -1.414*** -1.305*** 
    (0.091)  (0.092) (0.092) (0.096) (0.102) 
 1 Decision LON   0.771*** 0.514*** 0.689 0.531 0.532 
     (0.091) (0.110) (0.505) (0.586) (0.587) 
 4-5 Decisions LON   1.134*** 0.344*** 0.081 0.119 1.760*** 
     (0.048) (0.114) (0.282) (0.265) (0.385) 
1 Decision LON * 
Antiquity 
    -0.182 -0.140 -0.129 
       (0.510) (0.590) (0.591) 
4-5 Decisions LON * 
Antiquity 
    0.266 0.133 0.112 
       (0.267) (0.253) (0.254) 
Materials (0=Marble)        
          
Alabaster      -1.210*** -1.217*** 
        (0.109) (0.108) 
Bronze      -1.232*** -1.232*** 
        (0.066) (0.066) 
Dionite      -0.696*** -0.690*** 
        (0.168) (0.166) 
Limestone      -0.739*** -0.737*** 
        (0.093) (0.092) 
Quartz      -0.521** -0.523** 
        (0.226) (0.235) 
Sandstone      -0.916*** -0.949*** 
        (0.208) (0.204) 
Terracotta      -1.605*** -1.598*** 
        (0.071) (0.070) 
Wood      -0.944*** -0.955*** 
        (0.099) (0.098) 
Source Civilization 
(0=Egyptian) 
       
          
Roman      -0.131** -0.135** 
        (0.053) (0.053) 
Greek      -0.075 -0.079 
        (0.062) (0.062) 
 1 Decision NY       -1.391*** 
         (0.233) 
 3-5 Decisions NY       -0.747*** 
         (0.188) 
 6-9 Decisions NY       -0.310*** 
         (0.117) 
 _cons 7.304*** 8.564*** 7.149*** 8.633*** 8.731*** 9.668*** 9.508*** 
   (0.135) (0.170) (0.037) (0.172) (0.222) (0.235) (0.238) 
 Obs. 3399 3399 3399 3399 3399 3399 3399 
 R-squared 0.004 0.268 0.115 0.272 0.272 0.405 0.414 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  





The auction space is a complex universe in which to ask questions about the impacts of 
court activity. As expected, the data collection and empirical approach to modelling the effects of 
court decisions on prices and provenance sparked new questions within the intersection of law 
and economics. Future studies should consider other measurements of court decision’s impacts 
beyond precedence and the judicial realm in order to further analyze what qualities of court 
decisions have the greatest effect. The type of legal decision, its jurisdiction, and legal topic 
covered may have the effect on prices and provenance; it is not only the fact that a court decision 
was made that is significant. We should also consider other measurements of information 
quality, such as the age of the oldest provenance date provided, as ways to capture provenance 
information quality in the dependent variable position.  
This research supports the hypothesis that court activity affects economic markets. In the 
art market’s case, domestic court decisions having to do with ancient objects of many types 
could have a positive effect on the quality of provenance and price of ancient objects at auction. 
The variables with a higher number of active domestic decisions more frequently had significant 
positive effects on provenance information quality and price. The cross-country effects of court 
decisions from New York on London prices, and of those decisions from London on New York 
prices, were negative. Neither provenance quality nor court decisions fully explain variations in 
price, but this paper makes progress in modelling the pricing scheme of art and the determinants 
of provenance information quality. I also explored the reactions of buyers, sellers, and market-
making intermediaries to judicial determinations. I found that intermediaries and sellers, who 
play roles in filtering provenance information, can be impacted by court activity. I bolstered the 
theory that buyers are willing to pay a premium for provenance but posited the possibility of 
some consumers turn away from paying high prices for art altogether in response to court 
decisions.  
The changing legal landscape of the art market still deserves attention. Through studying 
the art market, we can learn about the effects of laws, regulations, and court activity on 
individuals and institutions. This research offered a novel auction dataset for investigating prices  
and product information. Results point to the potential usefulness of domestic court decisions in 
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